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IS DICK CHENEY UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
Glenn Harlan Reynolds *
The Vice Presidency “isn’t worth a bucket of warm spit.”
Vice President John Nance Garner 1
Twenty years ago I wouldn’t have advised my worst enemy to take the VicePresidency. It was God’s way of punishing bad campaigners, a sort of political purgatory for the also-rans. Now you’d be crazy not to take the job.
Aide to President Ronald Reagan 2
Many a true word is spoken in jest, we’re told. More surprisingly,
sometimes the truth even emerges, unsought, from the mouths of politicians
and their flacks. This may be the case with regard to recent claims by Vice
President Dick Cheney’s office that he is, properly speaking, a “legislative
officer” rather than a member of the executive branch. 3 The consequences
of this argument, however, may prove unpalatable to the Bush Administration on closer examination. Indeed, an activist Vice Presidency, in the
Cheney model, might be considered unconstitutional if the Vice President is
regarded as a legislative official. And, regardless of whether that characterization controls, there may be prudential reasons for keeping the Vice
President at a greater remove from executive affairs than has recently been
the case.
The Cheney-as-legislator kerfuffle appeared as part of an interbranch
struggle over the declassification of documents. Rep. Henry Waxman argued that Cheney was avoiding legally required scrutiny by the National
Archives and Records Administration, while Cheney’s office argued that
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Cheney, as President of the Senate, was not part of the executive branch and
hence not subject to such regulation. 4
The political backlash engendered by this position 5 led Cheney’s office
to withdraw to the more defensible position that the Office of the Vice President, like the Office of the President, was not an “agency” for purposes of
the statute. Nevertheless, Cheney’s spokesmen did not repudiate the earlier
position. 6 And, in fact, I believe that the positioning of the Vice Presidency
within the legislative branch—or, at any rate, outside the executive—may
be appropriate. Such a reading, however, would render Cheney’s role 7
within the Bush Administration, as well as the modern notion of Vice Presidents as junior versions of the commander-in-chief, unconstitutional.
Despite the unfriendly political response, the argument that the Vice
President is a legislative official is not inherently absurd. The Constitution
gives the Vice President no executive powers; the Vice President’s only duties are to preside over the Senate 8 and to become President if the serving
President dies or leaves office. 9 Traditionally, what staff, office, and per4
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quisites the Vice President enjoyed came via the Senate; it was not until
Spiro Agnew mounted a legislative push that the Vice President got his own
budget line. 10 The Vice President really is not an executive official. He or
she executes no laws—and is not part of the President’s administration the
way that other officials are. The Vice President can’t be fired by the President; as an independently elected officeholder, he can be removed only by
Congress via impeachment. (In various separation of powers cases, as
noted below, the Supreme Court has placed a lot of weight on this who-canfire-you test.)
Traditionally, Vice Presidents haven’t done much, which is why the
position was famously characterized by Vice President John Nance Garner
as “not worth a bucket of warm [spit].” 11 That changed when Jimmy Carter
gave Fritz Mondale an unusual degree of responsibility, 12 a move replicated
in subsequent administrations, particularly under Clinton/Gore and
Bush/Cheney. 13
The expansion of vice presidential power, however, obscures a key
point. Whatever executive power a Vice President exercises is exercised
because it is delegated by the President, not because the Vice President possesses any executive power already. The Vesting Clause of Article II vests
all the executive power in the President, with no residuum left over for anyone else. 14 Constitutionally speaking, the Vice President is not a junior or
co-President, but merely a President-in-waiting, notwithstanding recent political trends otherwise. To the extent the President delegates actual power
and does not simply accept recommendations for action, the Vice President
is exercising executive authority delegated by the President immune to removal from office by the President, unlike everyone else who exercises
delegated power. The only recourse for the President is withdrawal of the
delegation, with instruction to subordinate officials within the executive
branch not to listen to the Vice President. 15
10
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However, it seems pretty clear that the President isn’t allowed to delegate executive power to a legislative official, as that would be a separation
of powers violation. This is where the claim that Cheney is really a legislative official creates problems for the White House. To the extent that this is
what’s going on, the “Cheney is a legislative official” argument is one that
opens a big can of worms.
This question has produced no caselaw, and may never, as it may pose
a very difficult “political question” or incur standing problems that render it
not amenable to judicial review. But any potential challenge to the delegation of executive power to the Vice President poses some serious problems
if the Vice President is characterized as a legislative official. In general, the
delegation of executive power to legislative officials violates the Constitutional separation of powers.
In Bowsher v. Synar, the leading case on the subject, the Supreme
Court found that the provisions in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction act that vested powers to the Comptroller of the Currency violated
consitutional separation of powers principles, because the act granted executive authority to an official under the control of Congress. 16 Yet, in truth,
the Comptroller General was not all that easy for Congress to remove: He
could be impeached, as can any “civil officer” of the United States, or he
could be removed for cause via a joint resolution of Congress that was, in
practice, more difficult to put into practice than impeachment. More troubling was that the Comptroller General could not be removed by the President:
The critical factor lies in the provisions of the statute defining the Comptroller
General’s office relating to removability. Although the Comptroller General is
nominated by the President from a list of three individuals recommended by
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of
the Senate, and confirmed by the Senate, he is removable only at the initiative
of Congress. 17

The Court found that the power to remove is the key:
To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an officer answerable only
to Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in Congress control over the execution of the laws. As the District Court observed: “Once an officer is appointed, it is only the authority that can remove him, and not the authority that
appointed him, that he must fear and, in the performance of his functions,
obey.” The structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute
the laws; it follows that Congress cannot grant to an officer under its control
what it does not possess. 18

16
17
18

478 U.S. 714 (1986).
Id. at 727–28 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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As Bowsher states, separation of powers prohibits vesting of executive
powers in an official subject to (largely notional) control by Congress and
who is not removable by the President. If this is the case, then the case for
vesting executive powers in the Vice President—who is a legislative official himself, and also not removable by the President—is even weaker. Indeed, this arrangement seems perilously close to permitting “Congress to
execute the laws,” 19 which is plainly out of bounds. 20 Thus, if the Vice
President is a legislative official, as Cheney’s office argued, it would seem
that his expansive role in the Bush Administration is unconstitutional.
Nonetheless, a Supreme Court decision addressing this question is unlikely any time soon. There are no cases in the pipeline, and it is not clear
who would bring such an action. But litigation before the Supreme Court is
not the only avenue for addressing the arrangement. Congress is vested,
under Article I, section 8, with the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” 21 Congress can
protect the separation of powers, and the viability of Vice Presidents as
backup presidents, by employing this Constitutional power to prohibit the
Vice President from exercising any executive functions.
And, in fact, there may be practical reasons to limit vice presidential
involvement in day-to-day executive business regardless of whether we accept the characterization of the Vice Presidency as a legislative office or
not. Whether or not the Vice President is seen as a legislative officer, the
office of Vice President is something special. The Vice President is, after
all, primarily meant to serve as a sort of spare President, and—as with spare
tires or backup servers—it may be safest not to put the spare into ordinary
service before it’s needed. Presidents are lost in three ways: death, resignation, and impeachment. Vice presidential involvement in policy has the potential to put the “spare” role at risk in at least two of these contexts. When
Presidents resign or are impeached, it is often over matters of policy. Al19

Id.
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121–22, 138–39 (1976). There is also an interesting alternative argument that the Vice President may not exercise executive powers as a result of the Appointment
Clause; Buckley quotes language from U.S. v. Germaine, to the effect that
The Constitution for purposes of appointment very clearly divides all its officers into two classes.
The primary class requires a nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate. But foreseeing that when offices became numerous, and sudden removals necessary, this mode might be
inconvenient, it was provided that, in regard to officers inferior to those specially mentioned, Congress might by law vest their appointment in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the
heads of departments. That all persons who can be said to hold an office under the government
about to be established under the Constitution were intended to be included within one or the other of these modes of appointment there can be but little doubt.
Id. at 125 (emphasis added by the Buckley Court) (citing United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 50910 (1879)). The application of this language to the Vice President raises some interesting questions that
are beyond the scope of this brief essay, but the issue is certainly worth noting.
21
U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added).
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though the risk that a Vice President will be involved in the precipitating
events is hard to estimate, it is certainly higher for an activist Vice President
than it will be for a Vice President playing a traditionally quiescent role.
Though talk of impeaching the current occupants of either office is unlikely
to come to anything, it illustrates the risks. 22 As an assistant to Vice President Hubert Humphrey once remarked, the most important part of the Vice
President’s job is as backup President: “Judge the Vice-President on no
other measure than his preparation for succession. He is a reservoir for the
future rather than a resource for the present.” 23 Likewise, a Carter aide
noted the advantage of Mondale’s distance from public decision making:
“He can tell everyone he knows how to do the job, but no one can say ‘Fritz
Mondale was the one who got us into Iran.’” 24 That discussion aimed at
Mondale’s electoral fitness, but it also bears on the viability of a Vice
President who succeeds the President after resignation or impeachment.
Had Carter been impeached or forced to resign as a result of the Iran debacle, Mondale’s public distance would have been important in preserving his
ability to govern.
Vice Presidents have increasingly been used as resources in the present, however. This growing involvement of Vice Presidents in the executive department has been generally seen as a good thing, as it allows
someone deemed by the electorate competent enough to become President
to put his talents to work for the country, rather than having them languish
while the Vice President inquires daily into the President’s health. And
good arguments exist for not keeping the Vice President entirely out of the
loop; institutional memory is important for any succession, as illustrated
with the famous case of Harry Truman’s ignorance about the atomic bomb.
But the Vice President is the only person nationally elected to serve if the
President is unable to govern, and the Vice President’s involvement, a la
Cheney, in day-to-day policy activities sacrifices the distance that earlier
Vice Presidents possessed; those unhappy with President Bush’s Iraq policies, for example, can criticize Cheney in a way that critics of Carter’s Iran
policies could not criticize Mondale. In the event that policies in which the
Vice President is implicated go sufficiently awry to end a Presidency, the
Vice President will not be able to appear as a fresh start and may be liable
to impeachment or forced resignation as well. In such cases, this risks a
move to someone not nationally elected—the Speaker of the House or the
president pro tempore of the Senate—and very serious consequences for a
nation that would be, in those circumstances, already divided and vulnerable.
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All evidence to the contrary notwithstanding, we are not so short of executive talent that we must run such a risk in order to provide the President
with managerial assistance. As the Bush/Cheney Administration winds
down, with the party affiliation of the next administration sufficiently unclear so as to minimize partisan game-playing in Congress, now might be a
good time for Congress to consider requiring that future Vice Presidents
keep a greater distance from executive affairs.
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